DeFlock the Shoals
The argument for these cameras is always "public safety." So let's take that seriously and look at what the actual research says. Every study on this page is linked so you can read it yourself.

The safety question

"But they keep us safe." Do they, though? Here's what the research actually says.

Every time someone defends these cameras, it comes down to safety. So we went and read the actual studies instead of the marketing. Here's the honest picture, and it's not the one Flock sells.

What the evidence shows

The research is thin, and what exists is mixed at best

Here's something most people don't realize: for a technology that's spread to thousands of towns, there is shockingly little solid proof that it actually reduces crime. Researchers who study this for a living say so plainly. The cameras spread far faster than anyone bothered to test whether they work.

And when researchers do test it, the results don't match the sales pitch. Let's go through what the actual studies found.

The best experiments: helps solve, doesn't deter The strongest research (randomized controlled studies) found that license plate readers can help police investigate a crime after it happens, but did not reduce or deter crime from happening in the first place. One study assigned readers to auto-theft hot spots and found no drop in auto theft or crime overall. In plain terms: they might help chase down a car after the fact, but they don't stop the crime, which is the thing that's supposed to justify watching everyone.
Atlantic City, 2025: no drop in violent crime A 2025 study looked at Atlantic City after it put ALPR cameras on every road in and out of the city. The finding: the expansion did not reduce violent crime. Any other changes were tangled up with the fact that crime was falling nationwide at the same time, making it nearly impossible to credit the cameras.
San Marino, California: Flock's own example fell apart Flock loved to point to San Marino, California, claiming its cameras cut crime by 70%. When Forbes actually checked, the story collapsed: despite a brief dip, residential burglaries rose after Flock's cameras were installed. The company's flagship success story didn't survive a fact-check.
Maryland: almost nothing the cameras flag is serious crime Maryland's state fusion center found that only about 0.2% of scans produced a "hit" of any kind, and the ACLU's analysis found the overwhelming majority of those hits were registration or emissions issues, not violent or serious crime. Millions of law-abiding people scanned to flag a tiny number of expired tags.

Now, the fair counterpoint, because we're not going to do to you what Flock does. Flock says its cameras assisted around a million investigations last year and helped locate missing people, and a few single-agency studies show modest improvements in solving certain crimes after the fact. We're not claiming these cameras have never once helped solve a case. Of course a giant surveillance dragnet occasionally catches something.

But "it occasionally helps solve a crime after it happens" is a very different claim from "it makes your town safer," and it's nowhere near enough to justify recording every driver, all the time, with no warrant. The honest bottom line, in the words of the researchers themselves, is that the evidence is thin, and the best studies show these cameras help investigate crimes without actually preventing them.

Sources: Automated License Plate Readers, Vehicle Theft, and Clearance (CrimRxiv working paper, 2026); An Evaluation of a Major ALPR Expansion, Atlantic City (2025); Measuring the Cost-Effectiveness of ALPR (Cambridge Journal of Evidence-Based Policing, 2025); A Multi-Site Evaluation of ALPRs (Policing Institute); and Forbes' investigation of San Marino.

What happened when someone actually looked

A researcher found these cameras wide open on the internet, and used them to identify strangers

If you want to understand why this is dangerous, look at what technologist Benn Jordan found at the end of 2025. Working with the news outlet 404 Media and another security researcher, he discovered that at least 60 of Flock's Condor cameras—the high-resolution units that pan, tilt, and zoom to actively track subjects—were live-streaming to the open internet with no password and no encryption. Anyone with a web browser could watch. 404 Media confirmed it by driving to one of the cameras in Bakersfield, California, standing in front of it, and watching themselves on the public feed in real time.

What was on those feeds wasn't just license plates. The cameras were actively zooming in on people—capturing strangers Christmas shopping, unloading groceries, walking along public trails, and even filming unattended children at a playground. Jordan called it "Netflix for stalkers." Sit with that for a second: the hardware itself is built to follow and zoom in on individuals going about their normal, innocent lives.

This is the part that should stop you cold Jordan didn't stop at watching. To show how dangerous this infrastructure is, he pulled faces from the camera footage and ran them through publicly available open source intelligence (OSINT) tools. In minutes, he was able to identify specific people by name, find where they work, locate their families, and uncover their home addresses. Pointing basic public web tools at high-powered surveillance footage turns ordinary citizens into targets for anyone who gets access.

While Flock patched this specific vulnerability after it was exposed, that completely misses the fundamental issue. Software patches cannot fix the underlying constitutional danger. First, any centralized network of connected cameras is vulnerable to future leaks, credential breaches, rogue employees, and bad actors. But second—and most importantly—even if no outside hacker ever accesses the feed, the government still has this power.

Building a pervasive, pan-tilt-zoom surveillance dragnet that monitors, tracks, and archives the daily movements of innocent Americans violates the core spirit of the Fourth Amendment. The hardware is designed to watch people. The data is collected without suspicion or a warrant. The existence of the dragnet itself is the threat—whether accessed by an outside observer or by the state.

Sources: 404 Media, "Flock Exposed Its AI-Powered Cameras to the Internet. We Tracked Ourselves"; 404 Media follow-up on how he found them; and Benn Jordan's own video below.

The bigger point

Even if they did work, that wouldn't be the end of it

Here's the part that really matters, and it's the question to put to anyone who defends these cameras. The evidence that they reduce crime is weak. But suppose it wasn't. Suppose these cameras really did help. Would that alone make it okay?

It wouldn't, and our whole system is built on that answer. Lots of things would help police catch criminals. Letting officers search any house without a warrant would help. Putting a tracker on every citizen's car would help. Cameras in every living room would help. We don't do those things, and not because they'd be ineffective, but because we decided as a country that some level of government power over free people is not worth the trade, no matter how useful it might be.

That's what the Fourth Amendment is. It's a decision the Founders made that the government does not get to search and track you without cause and a warrant, even when doing so would be convenient for catching criminals. "It might help" was never supposed to be enough. If "it might help" were enough, there'd be no limit on government power at all. The whole point of having rights is that they hold even when giving them up would be useful.

So when someone says "but they help catch criminals," the honest response is: first, the evidence says they mostly don't, and second, even if they did, that was never the standard. We don't trade away our constitutional protections for convenience. That's not how a free country is supposed to work.

"I've got nothing to hide"

This isn't about hiding. It's about who's allowed to watch you.

You'll hear it constantly: "Only people with something to hide would be worried." It sounds reasonable. It isn't, and here's why.

The "nothing to hide" line quietly flips the whole thing around. It assumes the government has a right to watch you, and that you have to justify wanting privacy. That's backwards. In a free country, the government has to justify watching you, not the other way around. You don't have to prove you deserve privacy. They have to prove they have cause to take it away. That's the entire idea behind needing a warrant.

You have nothing to hide when you close your bathroom blinds, or seal an envelope, or have a private conversation. Privacy isn't about hiding wrongdoing. It's a basic condition of being a free person instead of a monitored one. The moment "I have nothing to hide" becomes the standard, you've conceded that your freedom depends on the government's goodwill, that they can watch everyone as long as most people aren't doing anything wrong. That is exactly the kind of unchecked power the Constitution was written to prevent.

Yes, it really is that serious Here's the part people don't want to say out loud. Every time a government body signs one of these contracts, the officials who sign it, and the government they represent, are agreeing to conduct warrantless tracking of their own citizens. That is acting against the spirit of the Fourth Amendment, against the very rights they swore an oath to protect. It doesn't matter if their intentions are good. The effect is a government building a surveillance record on free people who are suspected of nothing. Yes, it really is that serious, and treating it like it's no big deal is exactly how a free society sleepwalks into being a watched one.

Every elected official, police chief, and public servant swore an oath to support and defend the Constitution. When they sign contracts to build mass surveillance dragnet networks, they fail that oath in one of two ways:

Either they don't actually understand what they signed—meaning they rubber-stamped a massive expenditure of taxpayer money and invited invasive surveillance into our community without doing their basic due diligence—or they understand the technology and authorized warrantless tracking of innocent citizens anyway. That is fundamentally anti-American. In either case, signing away the privacy of the people you represent is an indefensible betrayal of public trust, freedom, and what it means to be American.

See what it's costing us Weak evidence it works, real cost to your rights, and a real dollar cost too. See exactly what Shoals governments have signed and spent on our receipts page, straight from their own records.

Now you've got the answer to "but safety."

Next time someone says these cameras keep us safe, you'll have the actual research, and the actual principle, to answer with. Share this page. Bring it to a council meeting. That's how this changes.